The problems the Biden Administration faces in having to propose a real plan – nearly a year too late for it to succeed – has become all too clear the moment one actually reads the full peace settlement attached to this commentary, and when one looks at the portions that are highlighted. In practice, this has meant that the Biden Administration has been compelled to propose a peace settlement that President Ghani has already virtually rejected and one that the Taliban will probably only accept if it feels that it can impose its own rule once the U.S.

defense contractors and civilian personnel. It is now mid-March, and there is still a deadline for the end of May that would require the U.S. capability, but with no real facts in terms of some form of agreed interim government or agreement to any aspect of what kind of Afghanistan could emerge out of a “peace” between the Afghan central government and the Taliban. The result is that the Biden administration has now taken office with very real facts on the ground in terms of the limits to U.S. personnel and military support, but it was never followed by any public peace plan – and it certainly never produced serious progress. The Trump administration’s peace agreement in February 2020 was followed by massive real cuts in U.S.

It is not too soon to say that it has been saddled with an almost impossible legacy. It is too soon to say that the Biden Administration has taken on “mission impossible” in proposing the new peace plan that Secretary Blinken has sent to the Afghan central government and the Taliban, which is attached at the end of this commentary.

A peace to end all peace